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ritish soldiers first came to Afghanistan in 1839, hoping to extend the Empire and counter growing Russian influence there. That four-year conflia
ended in the massacre of most of the retreating British force of 16,500. d emonstrating that, while Afghanistan could be conquered, holding it was another thing. In
1878, again fearing Russian influence in the region, England once more invaded
Afghanistan from its base in India. Britain's early vietol)' and regime change nearly
proved Pyrrhic. With their occupation unexpectedly costly in men and treasure, the

English gained control of Afghan foreign policy, then withdrew most of their forces
to India. In 1919, when remaining British units were attacked by Afghan forces, the
British initiated a third foray into Afghanistan, this one more successfu] than the
prior two adventures. Afghanistan nevertheless gained its independence in 1921.
Reminiscent of the British incursions into Afghanistan. from 1978 to 1992 the
Soviet Union sponsored an arm ed conflict between the communist Afghan government and anti-communist Muslim guerrillas. For their trouble, the Russians
learned the grim lesson of the Kipling poem, "Young British Soldier": "When
you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains. And the women come out to cut
up what remains, Jest roll to your rifle and blowout your brains, An' go to your
Gawd like a soldier .. .. "
• Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Law of War Issues in Ground Hostilities in Afghan istan
Now, prepared to overcome history with modern weapons and new tactics, the
United States is in the seventh year of its war in Afghanistan. Challenges abound. It
is a nation of massive mountain ranges and remote valleys in the north and east,
with desert-like conditions on the plains to the south and west. Road and rail systems remain minimal and many of those that do exist are in disrepair. About the
size of Texas, Afghanistan has a population of around twenty-four million. Now it
has a visiting military pop ulation embedded in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) numbering about 45,000 ground personnel, including 15,000
US troops, with another 19,000 US troops assigned to Joint Task Force 101, a part
of Operation Enduring Freedom forces assigned to Afghanistan . I
This article offers a summary examination of some of the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) issues encountered in US ground combat in Afghanistan. These issues
were discussed during the June 2008 Naval War College workshop, "The War in
Afghanistan," which was the genesis of this volume of the "Blue Book." Although
it is a conflict whose ending remains to be written, much of its LOAC outlines are
already discernable. Difficult issues involving conflict and individual status, questions about prisoner of war (POW) status, arguments regarding targeted killing
and "direct participation," the questionable deportation of individuals from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, and a disturbing number of war crime allegations
all arose in workshop discussions of ground combat in Afghanistan. This summary
account reflects a few of those issues as seen through the lens of one participant.
Not all attendees will agree with all of these assessments, but they provide departure points for discussion at fu ture workshops.

A nned Conflict Commences
The genesis of America's war in Afghanistan is well known. Long before the attacks
of September 11,200 I, the United States was concerned with the direction taken by
Afghanistan, as the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism said
in a 1999 Senate hearing:
Afghanistan has become a new safehaven for terrorist groups. In addition to bin Ladin
and al-Qa'ida, the Taliban play host to members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the
Algerian Armed Islamic [GJroup, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of militant
organizatio ns from Central Asia, includ ing terrorists from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 2

After the 9-1 1 attacks, President George W. Bush demanded that Afghanistan
dose its terrorist camps and hand over al Qaeda leaders in hiding there. 3 As Professor Dinstein points out, an ultimatum from one government to another, setting a
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deadline and warning that war will immediately commence once the deadline
lapses, will, at the designated time, indicate the initiation of armed conflict. Although there was no deadline in the Bush demand, it was dear that the Taliban
were required to act immediately or armed conflict wouJd be initiated by the
United States.4 Such was the case. "[US] military operations against Taliban and Al
Qaeda targets in Afghanistan commenced on October 7th .... There ought to be no
doubt that October 7th-and not September 11th-is the date of the beginning of
the war between the United States and Afghanistan."s In support of the American
initiation of armed conflict, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1386, authorizing establishment of an International Security Assistance Force
to maintain security in and around Kabul, after the fall of the Taliban. States participating in the ISAF were authorized "to take all necessary measures to fulfil its
mandate."6

Shifting Conflict Status
From the outset, a unique aspect of the ground war in Afghanistan has been the
heavy use of Special Forces:
Army Special Forces (SF) was tested to a degree not seen since the Vietnam WaI. With
little time to prepare for this mission, SF teams were to land by helicopter deep in
hostile territory, contact members of the Northern Alliance, coordinate their activities
in a series of offensives . . . and change the government of Afghanistan so that the
country was no longer a safe haven for terrorists. 1
Army SF units were the first US military personnel in Afghanistan for Operation
Enduring Freedom, as the invasion was denominated. A first twelve-man SF team
was inserted on October 19,2001, joining with a Northern Alliance Uzbek commander, Abdul Rashid. 8 SF forces would carry the brunt of US fighting for the brief
Common Article 2 9 period of the Afghan con flict. The Northern Alliance (the
United Islamic Front fo r the Salvation of Afghanistan ) had battled the Taliban government since the Alliance's formatio n in 1996, in a non -international armed conflict. Now, in the north of Afghanistan,SF/Northern Alliance operations took place
near Mazar-e Sharif, Kondoz and Taloqan . In other areas the Northern Alliance
contin ued its independent conflict with the Taliban central government.
Meanwhile, in the south of Afghanistan, on the night of October 19-20, an international armed conflict opened when US SF and Ranger forces made a nighttime parachute drop to initiate a raid on Kandahar, fighting Taliban units.
Common Article 2 and Common Article 310 conflicts were being fo ught at the
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same time in a single country. "The fact that a belligerent State is beset by enemies
from both inside and outside its territory does not mean that the international and
internal armed conflicts necessarily merge."ll A few weeks later, on Novem ber 13,
with the capture of Kabul by Northern Alliance, US and British forces, the international armed conflict began to ebb, but significant LOAC issues were beginning to
emerge.

Indi vidual Status and Prisoner of Wa r Issues
The US Army's official history of Operation Enduring Freedom notes, "At this
point the wholesale surrender of the Taliban forces began to cause problems."12
More than 3,500 Taliban fighters had surrendered around Kondoz. Several thousand
more were captured by Northern Alliance forces near Mazar-e Sharif. Douglas
Feith, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, writes, "The Pentagon's leadership appreciated the importance of honoring the Geneva Conventions, but issues
arose time and again that required the very difficult balancing of weighty but competing interests: on interrogation methods . . . and on whether to prosecute individuals as criminals or simply continue to hold them as enemy combatants."13 US
efforts to "balance" the Geneva Conventions against interrogation methods and
prosecution choices did not meet with notable success.
What was the status of Taliban captives taken in the brief Common Article 2
phase of the armed conflict? Did they qualify as POWs? Were they members of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict? Additional Protocol I defines an armed force
to include
all organized armed fo rces, groups and units which are under a command responsible
to that Party fo r the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse party. Such armed forces
shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict l~
Considering that definition, but for their compliance with international law, the
Taliban appear to qualify as the anned forces of Afghanistan, entitled to POW status
if captured in a Common Article 2 conflict. IS
Or were Afghanistan's Taliban akin to a post-World War I Freikorps in defeated
Germany? Consisting of private paramilitary groups, ultraconservative and highly
nationalistic, more than sixty Freikorps proliferated throughout Germany in 19 19,
one of them becoming the National Socialist German Workers' Party-the Nazi
Party. But in 1920 the Nazis were just another Freikorps, with an allegiance not to
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any German government but to their own Freikorps.16 There is an argument that
Afghanistan's arm ed forces ceased to exist after the fall of the communist
Najibullah government in Septem ber 1996 and were supplanted by rival Freikorpslike "armies," the Taliban being one of the more powerful. The argument continues that there is no showing that the Taliban became the armed forces of Afghanistan, professing allegiance to the government of the State. 11 The CommerJtary on
the Additional Protocols notes, "[ Clombatant status is given to regular forces only
which profess allegiance to a government or authority ... which claims to represent
a State which is a Party to the conflict. "I! Accordingly, under this construct the
Taliban were not "the armed forces of a Party to the conflict."19 Rather, the argument goes, they were merely the armed group in control of Afghanistan and its
government.
But the stronger case is that the Taliban were indeed the armed forces of Afghanistan. Starting in 1954, the International Law Commission (ILC) developed
guidelines for State responsibility. Article 8 of the liC's 200 1 document, Responsibility of States for Internationally W rongful Acts, reads: "The conduct of a person
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under intemationallaw if
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."2o That guidance,
combined with the plain language of Additional Protocol I's Article 43.1, leads to
the conclusion that the Taliban were the armed forces of Afghanistan.
Accepting, arguendo, that the Taliban were Afghanistan's armed forces during
the period of the Common Article 2 conflict, did its captured fighters merit POW
status as members of "the armed forces of a Party to the conflict"?21 Applying the
four conditions for lawful combatancy and POW status upon capture, the answer
is reasonably clear: although they were the armed forces of Afghanistan, they did
not wear uniforms or other distinctive fixed sign. Black turbans, common to m any
males in the region, do not suffice.
Since the [four ) conditions are cumulative, members of the Taliban forces failed to
qualify as prisoners of war under the customary law of war criteria. These criteria admit
no exception, not even in the unusual circumstances of . .. the Taliban regime. To say
that '[t)he Taliban do not wear uniforms in the traditional western sense' is quite
misleading, for the Taliban forces did not wear any uniform in any sense at all ... .22

Throughout the Common Article 2 phase of the conflict they failed to distinguish themselves and were not entitled to POW status. Although there are reasoned views in disagreement,23 the Taliban captured during the Common Article 2
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US in vasion were not merely soldiers out of uniform-or out of a Western conception of a uniform. They were not POWs.
What then was their status? Given the definition of civilians in Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, they were simply civilians and, being directly involved in an international armed conflict, they were un privileged belligeren ts, i.e., civilians who
took a direct part in hostilities, to be captured and tried u nder military or Afghan
domestic law-not for being unlawful combatants, which is not a crime in and of
itself, but for the unlawful acts that rendered them unlawful combatants.
One may question whether it would not have been wise to have a competen t tribuna! determine the status of those Taliban captured during the international
phase of the conflict since their presumptive status upon capture was POW.24 But
such tribunals are called for only in cases of doubt regarding the captive's status.
Was there doubt?25 The US Congressional Research SelVice specifies several reasons for not granting POW status:
The Administration has argued that granting tal Qaeda or TalibanJ detainees POW
status would interfere with efforts to interrogate them, which would in turn hamper its
efforts to thwart further attacks. Denying POW status may allow the Army to retain
more stringent security measures . ... The Administration also argued that the
detainees, if granted POW status, would have to be repatriated when hostilities in
Afghanistan cease, free ing them to commit more te rrorist acrs.26

Initially the US position on the status of both the Taliban and al Qaeda was
seemingly based on such faulty reasoning. Clearly a! Qaeda, a violent , transnational, non-State terrorist group, is in violation of all law, including the LOACP
Acts of terrorism like those commonly perpetrated by a! Qaeda are prohibited by
Geneva law, including the 1977 Protocols. 28 Initial individual status determinations were needlessly complicated by the inexplicable US view that the fight against
the Taliban was an armed conflict, yet was neither a Common Article 2 nor Common Article 3 confli ct. 29 Despite warnings from the US Secretary of StatelO and the
Department of State's Legal Adviser,3l the Bush adm inistration held that neither
the Taliban nor al Qaeda was protected by the Geneva Conven tions,12 including
Common Article 3 protection )3 The view that captured Taliban and al Qaeda
fighters were outside the protections of Common Article 334 was rejected by the Supreme Cour t in its 2006 Ha mdan decision,35 and the administration subseq uently
softened its position. Lieutenant Genera! Ricardo Sanchez, former US commander
of ground combat troops in Iraq, wrote of the presidential m emorandwn denying
the Taliban the protections of the Geneva Conventions:
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This presidential memorandum constituted a watershed event in U.S. military history.
Essentially, it set aside all of the legal constraints, training guidelines, and rules fo r
interrogation that formed the U.S. Army's foundation for the treatment of prisoners
on the battlefield .. . . According to the President, it was now okay to go beyond those
standards with regard to al-Qaeda terrorists. And that guidance set America on a path
toward torture.:l6

If not covered by the Geneva Conventions, even Common Article 3, what, in the
pre-Hamdan US view, was the status of captured Taliban and al Qaeda fighters,
and what treatment were they to be accorded? The murky answer was provided by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "The Combatant Commanders shall, in
detaining Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department
of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949."37 No individual status was specified. A forme r Assistant US Attorney General wrote, "This formulation sounded good. But it was very vague, it
was not effectively operationalized into concrete standards of conduct, and it left
all of the hard issues about 'humane' and 'appropriate' treatment to the discretion
of unknown officials."3$ Nor was it consistent with the law of armed conflict.
Captured Taliban were dubbed "enemy combatants." That phrase first appeared in the US Supreme Court opinion in the World War II Nazi saboteur case,
Ex parte Quirin. Chief Justice Stone wrote for the majority:
[A spy or] an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines
for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples
of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals. 39

Sixty-five years later, critics of Quirin note of the Court's phrase, "enemy combatant," that "the term's meaning is blurred by its failure to appear in the positive case
law existing at the time of the case as well as in the current treaty-based law of
war."4O Another critic dismissively asserts that« [t]he concept of the 'unlawful combatant' was invented to explain the legal fate of the eight German saboteurs tried in
Quirin . ... The concept ... explained why the saboteurs were entitled neither to a
jury trial under the Constitution nor to POW status under the Hague Convention."4l Although Quirin continues to be cited when supportive of a writers' position, the opinion is muddled, and a poor example of LOAC insight that lacks legal
clarity.
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Canadian Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin writes, "[C1onfusion has also
been created by the United States' use of an even more generic term: 'enemy combatants."'42 Colonel Charles Garraway agrees:
The term ~ enemycombatant" ... merely adds to the confusion. Traditionally, the term
~enemycombatant" refers to legitimate combatants who are entitled to prisoner of war
status. It is a new usage to describe those who are deemed to be unlawful belligerents as
such. What term is left for those legitimate combatants belonging to enemy armed

forces?43
Today, "enemy combatant," like the term "combatant" itself, has come to represent a status rather than an activity. A definition of "enemy combatant" binding
US Armed Forces is found in a Department of Defense (DoD) directive: "Enemy
combatant. In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term 'enemy combatant' includes both 'lawful enemy combatants' and <unlawful enemy combatants."'44 No
mention is made of the treatment due a captured enemy combatant and the definition appears tailored for the "war on terrorism," rather than for general LOAC use.
Its melding of lawful and unlawful combatants, long-established separate LOAC
statuses, is also notable since, upon capture in a Common Article 2 conflict, the two
are entitled to significantly diffe ring protections. Whether this definition survives
to become State practice, or the subject of treaties, remains to be seen.
A competing US directive, loint Publication 3-63, adopts the just-mentioned
DoD directive's definition but, significantly, omits its last sentence: "Enemy combatant. In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. "4$ Again, the l oint Publication's
definition does not mention the captive' s individual status (unless "enemy combatant" is considered a discrete status), or presumptive POW status or protected
person status, one or the other of which must be applicable in a Common Article 2
conflict. In Afghanistan, the United States has been at pains to avoid referring to
captured opposing fighters as POWs. The unsatisfactory term "enemy combatant"
is instead used.
Taxonomic issues aside, Operation Enduring Freedom continued, its participants oblivious to status issues. On November 16,2001, the battle of Tara Bora began. In support of Afghan warlord Hazrat Ali, dozens of US SF operators guided
airstrikes on al Qaeda mountain strongholds. Although the constant strikes and
pressure from ground forces reduced the enemy presence, fighting came to a halt
in mid-December. Most of the enemy had either fough t to the death or had found
refuge across the Pakistan border. 46
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Also in November, at Tarin Kot, US aircraft: guided by SF ground controllers
dedmated Taliban fighters, killing an estimated one thousand. On November 25,
the first US conventional forces entered Afghanistan when five hundred Marines
of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) debarked fro m USS Peleiiu and
landed at Kandahar. They had moved by helicopter from their shipboard base four
hundred miles inland to Kandahar, so distant an inland objective not being the
usual Marine ship-to-shore movement. The 15th MEU departed a few weeks later,
replaced by the 26th MEU,~ 7 who themselves departed within two months. On the
ground, Afghanistan was still essentially an SF/Northern Alliance show.
Also, on November 25, 200 1, during a riot at a prison located at Mazar-e Sharif,
CIA Special Activities Division officer Johnny M. Spann was the first American
killed by Taliban enemy action.4I!
Un manned Aerial Vehicles and Targeted Killing
O peration Enduring Freedom is notable for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). Their role in ground combat has been significant because at least one
UAY, the MQ-l Predator, can carry and fire two laser-guided air- to-ground Hellfire missiles, changing the fundamental nature of ground combat when it is
employed.
Predator UAYs first deployed to the Balkans in 1995. Since then, the Predator's
offensive capabilities have increased. Today, it carries a daytime television nose
camera, a forward-looking infrared camera for low-light and night operations, and
a laser designator. Cruising at eighty-five miles per hour at 25,000 feet, a Predator
can loiter for in excess of forty hours.~9 The first armed Predator mission in Afghanistan was flown on October 7, 200 1.
Employing the Predator, the US admitted engaging in targeted killing for the first
time.so On November 3, 2002, over the desert near Sana, Yemen, a CIA-controlled
Predator tracked an SUV co ntaining six men. One of the six, Qaed Salim Sinan
al-Harethi, was believed to be a senior al Qaeda lieutenant who had played a major
role in the 2000 bombing of the American destroyer USS Cole. He "was on a list of
'high-value' targets whose elimination, by capture or death, had been called for by
President Bush ."sl The United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi's movements for months. Now, away from any inhabited area, the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at the vehicle. Its six occupants, including al- Harethi, were killed.52
There is no consensus definition of "targeted killing" in the LOAC or in case law. 53
However, a reasonable definition is offered by International Committee of the Red
Cross (JeRe) legal advisor Nils Melzer: "The use of lethal force attributable to a
subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to
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kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them."54
Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3, usually considered to be customary law, appears to prohibit targeted killing: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by
this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Those
interested in international law or the LOAC know that for several years the phrase
"unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" has been the subject of debate and the focus of meetings of international experts sponsored by the
ICRC and the Asser Institute. S5 The plain meaning of the phrase indicates that terroristsand terrorist accomplices, such as weapon makers and communications experts, cannot lawfully be targeted unless, at the time of targeting, they are actually
directly engaged in hostilities. Those who argue against such a constricting limitation urge that such terrorists should be lawful targets whenever and wherever their
locations can be confirmed.
But events on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq are making the debate moot.
As Melzer notes:
Today, targeted killing is in the process of escaping the shadowy realm of half-legality
and non-accountability, and [is] gradually gaining legitimacy as a method of counterterrorism and "surgical" warfare. Several Governments have expressly or implicitly
acknowledged that they have resorted to targeted killings in thei r respective efforts to
curb insurgent or terrorist activities. 56

Those governments include the United States, Israel, Russia, Pakistan, the United
Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland.
For better or worse, in the United States the 9-11 attacks caused shifts in public
opinion, and often shifts in public policy, relating to terrorism and terrorists. For
example, torture, previously rejected out of hand, shockingly became acceptable. A
2005 sUlVey indicated that sixty-one percent of the American public would not rule
out torture,S7 and President George W. Bush said in a nationally televised address
that "the CIA used an alternative set of procedures"sa when interrogating certain
captured terrorist suspects.
Another post-9-11 change in policy and attitude related to targeted killing.
Once anathema to America (in public at least),59 after 9- 11 targeted killing became
tolerated/,o then embraced. Under a series of classified presidential findings, President Bush reportedly broadened the number of named terrorists who may be killed
if their capture is impracticaL 61 In early 2006, it was reported that since 9- 11 the US
had successfully carried out at least nineteen targeted killings via Predator-Hred
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Hellfi re missiles. In June 2006, the targeted killing o f Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was celebrated as a US strategic and political victory.
In October 200 1, a US Predator killed the military chief of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In June 2004, a senior Taliban planner, Nek Mohammad, was killed bya UAVlaunched m issile. In May 2005, o n the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a ClA-controUed
UA V killed Haitham al-Yemeni, a suspected senior figure in Afghan al Qaeda operations.6l In August 2008, an Afghan warlord 's camp in the mountains of Pakistan
was destroyed and nine insurgen ts reportedly killed by four missiles.6) The roster
continues to lengthen. Though it occasionally admits to targeted killing, the US
government rem ains reticen t and evasive in acknowledging employmen t of the
tactic, but its value to ground com bat operations is apparent.64
Even considering their inevitable collateral damage, the effectiveness of UAVs
mated with H ellfire m issiles, combined with their relatively low cost and zero
exposure of friendly personnel, assures their con tinued use. Although targeting
errors, actual or contrived, are media staples,6s the international trend toward
their legitimization, whether or not seen to be in compliance with Article 51.3, is
all but assured.
Meanwhile, in April 2002, coalition m embers met in Geneva and agreed on five
" pillars" o f change in Afghanistan. T he United States assu med responsibility for
b uilding the Afghan army; Germany agreed to build the Afghan police; Italy took
on the judicial system; the United Kingdom was to take the lead on curbing illegal
drug use; and Japan accepted responsibility for disarm am ent, d em ilitarization and
rein tegration of the Afghan warlords and m ilitias. 66 Six years on, one can o nly
smile ruefully at such ambitious plans.
By late 2002 an Afghanistan conflict timeline was discernable. The US in vasion
was in October 200 1. Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in December.67 According to the 200 I Afghan Bonn Agreemen t, Afghan sovereignty re-arose
in December 200 1 with the establishment of the In terim Authority.68 Accepting
those dates, the international armed conflict phase of the "war" lasted sixty-two
days and the US occupation a mere fifteen days. In June 2002 the Afghans created a
transitional govern men t referred to as a LoyaJirga, or grand assembly.
In terms of ground combat, one observer noted that " [d [ u ty in Afghanistan isn't
turning out to be the low-key operation many expected."69 An infantry officer reported, "Afghanistan is home to some of the most extrem e terrain and environmental conditions in the world. During our time there we operated in mostly
mo untainous terrain in excess of 8,000 feet [above J mean sea level, with temperatures ranging d uring the d ay from 80 to 100 degrees."7o
Thro ugh 2003 Afghanistan's stresses on troop availability were reflected in tour
lengths: Army tours of duty were from nine to twelve m on ths; Marine Corps u nits
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rotated into and out of country every seven months; Air Force personnel rotated
every three or four months. Five years later, manning levels and tour lengths continue to bedevil Pentagon planners.

Transfer of Protected Perwns from Afghanistan to Guan tanamo Bay
During the Newport workshop, several of us wondered why more has not been
made of the movement of prisoners from Afghanistan and Iraq to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The history of deportations in armed conflicts is familiar. During
World War I Germany deported thousands of French and Belgian citizens to Germany as forced laborers. The German action was called "an act of tyranny, contrary
to all notions of humanity."71 Georg Schwarzenberger wrote: "In World War II,
Nazi Germany resorted to deportation as part of its policies ofterrorisation and extermination and, even more so, for the purpose of implementing its slave-labour
programme."n In response, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg specified that the deportation of civilians from occupied territoriesfor any purpose-was a crime against humanity and a breach of the laws and customs ofwar.73 In the post-war "Subsequent Proceedings," tried under authority of
Control Council Law No. 10, unlawful deportation was among the charges in several of the twelve military tribunals. National tribunals prosecuted individuals for
deportation as well. 7~
Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV addresses the removal of protected persons:
"Individual .. . transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. .. "75
The Commetltary to Convention IV explains, "There is doubtless no need to give
an account here of the painful recollections called forth by the 'deportations' of the
Second World War.... The prohibition ... is intended to forb id such hateful practices for all time.... The prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions .... "76
How then to explain the history of forced movement of individuals from Afghanistan and Iraq to Guantanamo in the "war against terrorism"?
In non-international conflicts, Additional Protocol II mandates that
"[cJ ivilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict."77 The Statute of the International Criminal Court76 renders deportations in non-international conilicts a war crime as well, while the
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY)
and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda denominate deportations as
crimes against h umanityJ9
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The JCRe's study, Customary lntertlational Humanitarian Law, states, "Numerous military manuals specify the prohibition of unlawful deportation or transfer of
civilians in occupied territol)'."80 The study goes on to specify the legislation of
thirty-nine States, several applicable in non-international conflicts, making deportation of civilians a domestic offense. The ICRC study finds State practice to establish the rule against deportation, in both international and non-international
armed conflicts, as customary internationallaw. 81 Finally, Geneva Convention IV
mandates that "[ pJrotected persons accused of offenses shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences there. "82
These prohibitory sources against deportation indicate the incontrovertible nature of the prohibition. Throughout the armed conflict in Afghanistan and the US
occupation, Article 49 applied, prohibiting the deportation of protected persons
from the occupied State to Guantanamo.
Who is a "protected person" whose deportation is prohibited? Geneva
Convention IV, Article 4, tells us that, essentially, a protected person is someone in
an international armed conflict, other than a POW, who is in the hands of the other
side. There are limitations on the application of protected person status, of coursenotably the "nationality requirement" and cobelligerents. The cobelligerent's requirement of diplomatic representation is significant,83 because at the time of the
armed conflict with the United States, the Taliban government did not have such
relations with the United States. The nationality and cobelligerent limitations on
protected person status did not apply to nationals of Afghanistan vis-a-vis the
United States.
Can extraordinary measures, such as deportation, be taken in the case of unlawful combatants, as many Afghan insurgents were? The "unprivileged belligerent"
has been characterized by the ICRC "as describing all persons taking a direct part in
hostilities without being entitled to do so and who therefore cannot be classified as
prisoners of war on falling into the power of the enemy."84
Dinstein argues that
[al person who engages in military raids by night. while purporting to be an innocent
civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an unlawful
combatant. He is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the
enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy. Nor
does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status . 8S

Captured unlawful combatants are entitled to the basic humanitarian
protections of Common Article 3 and of Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1.86
While being an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime, the unlawful combatant
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forfeits the combatant's privilege and potential POW status, and may be charged
for law of war violations that made him an unlawful combatant.
What is "deportation" in the LOAC? William Schabas states that
[d Jeportation ... involves the movement of individuals. under du ress, from where they
reside to a place that is not of their choosing. Deportation would involve such transfer
when an international border is crossed. It must be proven that the accused
intentionally perpetrated an act or omission to effect such deportation .. . that was not
motivated by the security of the population or imperative military reasons. 87

ICfY jurisprudence defines deportation simply as forcible transfer beyond one's
home State borders,u and finds it an inhumane act. 89
In the pertinent timeframe, the seventy-seven-day-long US-Afghanistan conflict , whose deportation to Guantanamo Bay was prohibited? Answer: captured
unlawful combatants who were nationals of a State other than Afghanistan and, because Afghanistan lacked normal diplomatic relations with the United States,
Afghan nationals held by the United States in occupied Afghanistan who were allegedly unlawful combatants. Individuals in both categories were protected
persons.
The only discovered US government document addressing deportations to
Guantanamo is a March 2004 draft opinion written by the Justice Department's
Office of Legal Counsel. The fo urteen-page memorandum to Alberto Gonzales,
then-Counse1 to the President, is entitled "Permissibility of Relocating Certain
' Protected Persons' from Occupied Iraq."90 Relying on a definition of deportation
taken from Roman times, the draft memorandum argues that Geneva Convention
IV does not prohibit the deportation of protected persons who are illegal alienspresumably meaning foreign fighters--<ap tured in Iraq. Creating the LOAC from
whole cloth, the memorandum argues that protected persons, even if nationals of
the State in which captured, may be deported as long as they have not been formally accused of wrongdoing, apparently an effort to circumvent the requirement
of Article 76 of the Fourth Convention that protected persons accused of offenses
be detained in the occupied State.
The draft memorandum's conclusion is that the United States may removedeport-protected persons when the intent is not to accuse them of wrongdoing
but only to interrogate them. From the memorandum: "[AJ rtide 49(1 )'s prohibition of forcible transfers and deportations out of occupied territory ... should not
be construed to extend to temporary transnational relocations of brief but not indefinite duration" (emphasis in original). This would allow authorities to simply
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designate a protected person as destined for interrogation and deport him without
furth er accountability.
The draft memorandum was never finalized,91 although its conclusions were
confirmed by Mr. Gonzales when he was nominated to be Attorney General of the
United States.9l "A related issue that has inexplkably escaped broader attention is
the fate of persons apprehended in the 'war on terrorism' who were or are being
held at undisclosed locations.'>93 The draft memorandum was the basis for the secret removal by the CIA of at least a dozen detainees from Iraq.94
How many Afghan and Iraqi prisoners held by the United States were deported
to Guantanamo in contravention of Article 49? It is unlikely there will ever be a satisfactory answer.

Increased War Crimes Prosecutions---Perception or Fact?
Large-scale ground operations in Afghanistan, e.g., the US Army's O perations Anaconda (March 1-16,2002), Valiant Strike (March 20-25, 2(03) and Mountain Viper (September 4-5, 2003), do not usually give rise to charges ofLOAC violations.
Day-to-day operations in urban Afghan settings, however, have seen many such allegations. War crime charges are even more frequent in Iraq, where urban operations are more common.
Anytime a government puts high-power weapons in the hands of very young
men and women, bad things will inevitably happen.9s In fighting terrorists who ignore customary battlefield norms, incite retaliation and hide within the noncombatant population, the spur for opposing forces to commit offenses is only
heightened. The "CNN factor" often ensures that offenses are broadcast worldwide
in near-real time. The armed forces are in a difficult position: fail to formallyinvestigate even flimsy allegations of wrongdoing and be pilloried for covering up war
crimes, or prefer court-martial charges with slim evidence and be pilloried as
overly aggressive martinets.
But one may ask, as some workshop attendees did around Naval War College
luncheon tables, have LOAC violations actually increased in Afghanistan, or have
their reporting and prosecution increased? Are US armed forces members less controlled today or has a heightened awareness of the law of armed conflict resulted in
greater command awareness and increased prosecutions? Either way, anecdotal evidence suggests that there have been proportionally more courts-martial for
LOAC-related offenses than in previous armed conflicts.
One cannot obtain accurate numbers of courts-martial for such violations. Each
of the military Servkes annually reports total numbers of convictions (as opposed
to charges) to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, but the convictions are
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not broken down by offense. Even if they were, the murder of a POW, for example,
would simply be reported as a murder, with no victim, no grave breach and no
LOAC violation indicated. There is no requirement in federal law or military regulation to do otherwise.96 Nor are media reports reliable indicators of indiscipline or
criminality.
In December 2004 the Department of Defense reported that 130 US combatants
had been punished or charged with prisoner abuse in Afghanistan, Iraq or
Guantanamo.97 Numbers in other reports for specific geographic areas vary.98 In
any event, there is no base point to which any number may be compared. Is 130 an
unusually high nwnber or normal or unusually low? Figures recorded in the current conflict cannot be compared to similar offenses in prior conflicts because,
even ifnumbers had been kept-and they were not---everycon l1ict is unique, with
fundamentally different conflict characteristics that would make comparisons
meaningless.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq there have clearly been a disturbingly high number of deaths of detainees at the hands of US warders. The New York Times reported: "At least 26 prisoners have died in American custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan since 2002 in what Army and Navy investigators have concluded or
suspect were acts of criminal homicide, according to military officials.'>99 A few
months later the Los Angeles Times reported that "[aJutopsy reports on 44 prisoners who died in US custody in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that 21 were victims of
homicide, incl uding eight who appear to have been fatally abused by their captors."IOO And a few months after that the Philadelphia Inquirer reported: "N inetyeight detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan have died in US custody since August 2002,
and 34 of them were suspected or confirmed homicides, a hwnan-rights group reported yesterday. Only 12 cases have resulted in punishment of any kind .. . ."11)1
Which media figures, all said to be based on armed forces figures, can be relied
upon-if any?
There are media reports of combatant misconduct occurring in Afghanistan,
most involving detainee mistreatment l02 but not all. A closely watched case arose
in March 2007 in Jalalabad, when it was reported that ten to nineteen Afghan noncombatants were killed (the actual nwnber has never been settled) and thirty-three
more wounded by uncontrolled US fire when a Marine Corps convoy was hit by a
car bomb that slightly wounded one Marine. As the convoy sped from the scene it
allegedly continued to fire on Afghan civilians over the course of a six-mile "escape."
The area's Army commander immediately ordered the Marine unit out of the country, initiated an investigation, paid $2,()(H) in compensation for each reported death
and apologized to the victims and their families on behalf of the United States. The
Marine commander of the convoy unit was relieved by his Marine O:lrps seniors. At
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the same time the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Conway, publicly expressed his anger at the Army commander's expressions of regret and acceptance of responsibility, which General Conway considered premature. The
involved Marines disputed the initial account, insisting they had only returned fire
after the initial car bombing and subsequent lengthy escape. IO}
In May 2008, a court ofinquiry cleared all Marines involved of criminal charges.
In a fourteen -month arc the incident moved from newspaper front pages to back
pages to silence, leaving hard feelings between the Marines and the Army, and Afghans distrustful and embittered against the United States. If not typical, it was a
not uncommon progression, initially raising the specter of Haditha-like horrific
unlawful conduct, fading to anticlimax and no charges.
There have indeed been numerous courts-martial involving war crime charges
and there have been instances in which prosecution was fou nd unwarranted. There
have been convictions in which sentences were not commensurate with the offenses of which the accused was convicted . 11M All that can be said with assurance is
that, after seven years in Afghanistan, there is no documented answer to the question of whether there are more LOAC violations than in prior conflicts; only arguments. Several attendees suggested the Department of Defense should require that
all formal allegations of violent offenses involving indigenous individuals and
armed service personnel, including prisoners of any description, whether or not resulting in trial, be periodically reported by the armed Service involved to a common DoD authority.
Meanwhile, in mid-2006 the US Marine Corps departed Afghanistan, leaving
ground fighting to the Army and NATO combatants, and fledgling Afghan National Army troops. The Marine units would move on to Iraq. One observer noted:
"The end of the Corps' Afghan deployments comes as the overall U.S. commitment
to that country is on the decline. Military officials have said that American forces
will be reduced from the roughly 23,000 troops there now to 16,000 by the end of
the summer [of2006]. "lOS Planning was underway for the so-called "surge" in Iraq,
which began in February 2007. Even at some tactical cost, US troop drawdowns in
Afghanistan were required to meet the manpower needs of the coming "surge." By
2007, Afghanistan was being referred to as the "forgotten war."I06 But, once the
surge was over, the Marines were back,107 to the consternation of the Marine
Corps' Commandant. los But, almost immediately, new plans were announced indicating they would yet again leave Afghanistan, this time within a year. 109 Such
undulating personnel requirements, presenting planners with constantly moving
targets, are one more price of fighting two wars at once.
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Conclusion
After more than seven years of ground combat in Afghanistan, at the cost of more
than nine hundred lives, well over five hundred of them American, and having
spent in excess of $ 175 billion, I IO where are we?
We have succeeded in deposing the Taliban government and installing an
elected parliament. We have disrupted al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There has been a
major increase in availability of basic health care. A central banking system and a
stable currency are in place. Yet, mid-2008 reports, not all of which are mediabased, present a discouraging picture. Among m edia reports were these: "Security
in the provinces ringing the capital, Kabul, has deteriorated rapidly in recent
months. Today it is as bad as at any time since the beginning of the war .... " 111
"[T Jhe Taliban are demonstrating a resilience and a ferocity that are raising alarm
here [in Kabul], in Washington and in other NATO capitals."112" A1 Qaeda is more
capable of attacking inside the United States than it was last year .... "113 "There
were ten times as many armed attacks on international troops and civilian contractors in 2007 as there were in 2004. Every other measure of violence, from roadside
bombs to suicide bombers, is also up dramatically."114In April 2006, a National Intelligence Estimate reported that "the global jihadist movement ... is spreading
and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. "115 In 2007, the last year for which totals
are available, enemy encounters, roadside bombs, suicide bombers and casualty
figures all reached new highs. In 2008, the Baltimore Stln reported: "The chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee, Democratic Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, has said the United States ' risks strategic failure' in Afghanistan."116
Poppy crop eradication, once a primary US mission in Afghanistan, has been
abandoned. The media has reported that "[t]he Marines don't want to antagonize
the local population by joining US-backed efforts to destroy the crop. 'We're not
coming to eradicate poppy,' [a Marine major] says. 'We're coming to dear the
Taliban."'1l 1
An open Pakistan border combines with Pakistani perfidy and Afghan exhaustion to undercut coalition efforts against a resurgent Taliban. The invasion of Iraq
eclipsed Afghanistan as the battleground against terrorism, stripping it of military
resources, American funding and public interest. So far, efforts to deny sanctuary
to terrorists in Afghanistan have been unsuccessful. One reporter alleges: " In a vicious cycle, narcotics, corruption and the absence of law and order are rotting the
heart of the government and rippling the economy. Despite massive Western investment, Afghanistan is close to being a failed state."118
An August 2008 editorial in the New York Times reflected the widespread concern regarding the progress of Operation Enduring Freedom:
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The news out of Mghanistan is truly alarming. ... Taliban and foreign Qaeda fighters
are consolidating control over an expanding swath of territory sprawling across both
sides of the porous Mghanistan-Pakistan border. .. .Unless the United States, NATO
and its central As ian allies move quickly, they could lose this war.... [sJeven years have
already been wasted. .. . Mghanistan's war is not a sideshow. It is the principal military
confrontation between America and NATO and the forces responsible for 9/11 . ... 119

Seven years of ground combat in Afghanistan have not gained control of Afghanistan's borders, which is critical to ultimate success. The Afghan government has
not yet established its authority or credibility. The Taliban are far from defeated.
The United States is not at the point of taking Kipling's advice to "' est roll to
your rifle and blowout your brains An' go to your Gawd like a soldier." But there is
a large measure of ground combat yet to come in Afghanistan.
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